

### Russian Macro and Fixed Income

The new investment opportunities

Iskander Lutsko
Chief Investment Strategist

November 2018

# Russian macro update: healthy resilience and positive outlook



- GDP growth slowed from the 1.9% y-o-y in 2Q18 to 1.3% y-o-e in 3Q18, which we think is still a decent performance given the base effect (+2.2% y-o-y in 3Q17). The average growth rate for 9m18 reached 1.5% y-o-y.
- We forecast acceleration in GDP growth in Q4 to over 2% due to higher industrial production growth rates. For the full year 2018 we expect the real GDP growth to be just under 2%.
- Industrial production growth accelerated to 3.7% y-o-y in October from 2.1% in September. This was due to pickup in manufacturing growth, which we expect to remain strong in 4Q18.
- Current account surplus for 10M18 rose to \$88bln, implying that in October it was \$12.1bln, thanks to higher oil prices, stronger exports and weaker ruble. We expect current account surplus for the full year 2018 to reach \$104bln (over 6.3% of GDP).
- Inflation is likely to decelerate in November, it can be as low as 3.5% y-o-y, as in October, hence we expect it to be below 4.0% y-o-y by the year-end. This implies that we can expect CPI growth of just 0.8-0.9% in November-December.
- CBR recent monetary and fiscal policies have helped to absorb external shocks. On September 14 the Central Bank hiked policy rate by 25 basis points to mitigate the growing inflation risks. Besides, in late August the bank suspended FX purchases (a total of \$30bln) till the end of the year to reduce the exchange rate volatility.
- Budget surplus for 10M18 reached over 3trln rubles thanks to a 39% buildup of budget revenues as a result
  of higher oil prices and weaker ruble. We expect budget to remain in surplus in 2018 (2.5% GDP), for the first time
  since 2013.

# Latest developments and important notes




- Russian total external debt, including corporate and financial sectors' obligations, has shrunk to a nine-year low of \$467bln, which is almost equivalent to Bank of Russia's international reserves (\$462bln). As of October 2018, Russia's total external debt is down by \$51bln year-to-date to \$467bln, thanks to redemptions by non-financial sector borrowers (\$27bln).
- **Total external debt redemptions in Q4 2018 will be an equivalent of the same period last year**, but in Q1'19 will be lower by 42% yoy.
- New US sanctions on Russia are expected to be postponed till late January or early February 2019 according to our estimates.
- Implied FX volatility is the key indicator of CBR monetary policy and FX purchases
- Oil price growth reduces the share of investments in the Russian GDP structure due to higher FX purchases making it harder to reach 25% level, targeted by the government by 2024.
- Capital outflows in October from the private sector reached almost \$10.3 bln, it is the highest monthly outflow since early 2015, which brought the 10m18 outflow figure to \$42.2 bln out of which \$27bln are corporate redemptions, purchases of foreign assets and \$7bln net outflows by non-residents for 10months of 2018.
- **Public investment buildup, which is an important driver for the economic growth**, is to continue. In 2018 public investment can increase by 30-40% from 1trl ruble last year.
- Russia is moving up in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking. The biggest improvement was observed in the category Dealing with Construction Permits in this category Russia has climbed from 115th place all the way up to 48th
- Vladimir Putin approval ratings are nearing the 18-year lows in October they plunged to 66% from 80% in January. It indicates that now a majority of the country's population believes that Russia is heading in the wrong direction.

### Russian macro: Defensive play in EM



Despite risks of new sanctions, rising geopolitical tensions and EM sell-off, the Russian economy is now more resilient than some of its EM peers. This resilience is due to this year's strong current account and budget surplus, low dollarization levels (<25%), low external debt (<30% of GDP) and moderate inflation (<4%).




Source: ITI Capital, IMF

### Public Debt and Budget Balance



Russian public debt is estimated to be 18% GDP – it is the lowest level in the CIS space and one of the lowest in the world. The budget surplus is currently estimated to stand at 2.4% GDP, by the year-end it can reach near 2% GDP and is expected to break through the 3% mark in 2019.



Source: Finance ministries, National statistics agencies, ITI Capital

### Russia and CIS Macro Summary



	Real GDP growth,											
	Nominal (	GDP, \$bln	GDP per	r capita, %	Populat	ion, mln	%	Bu	dget balance,	% of GDP	Total public de	bt, % GDP
Real sector	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E
Russia	1 640	1 680	11,9	12	144,5	144,8	1,8	2	2,4	3,2	18	18,5
Kazakhstan	167,1	175,7	9	9,6	18,5	18,7	3,7	3,5	1,1	0,2	26,9	27,3
Ukraine	126,4	129,1	2,5	2,8	42,2	42,1	2,7	3	-2,5	-2,2	69,8	69,7
Belarus	58	57,6	6	6,2	9,4	9,4	3,8	3,5	2,4	0,7	47,2	48,4
Azerbaijan	43,4	46,1	4,2	4,25	9,6	10,1	1,2	2	6,8	2,3	41,1	40
Georgia	16,1	17,1	4,1	4,2	3,7	3,7	4,3	4,5	-1,5	-1,5	42,5	43
Armenia	12,5	13,4	4,1	4,2	3	3	5	4,5	-2,6	3	57	54,6
Tajikistan	7,4	8,1	1	1	9	9,2	8	7	-5	-5,4	56,2	56

External indicators	Current accoun	t, % GDP	External debt, % GDP		Total reserves, \$bln		Sov Eurobonds, Z-spread, bps	Credit rating	
	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	Current	Current	
Russia	6,3	6,4	30	26,3	465	555	159	Ba1/BBB-/BBB	
Armenia	-3,8	-2,9	86,8	83	2,3	2,3	244,6	B1/-/B+	
Azerbaijan	8,2	2,4	-	-	5,5	5,5	181,6	Ba2/BB+/BB+	
Belarus	-2,5	-3,5	68,1	68,7	6,5	7,1	359	B3/B/B	
Georgia	-9,4	-9,5	112	109	2,8	2,8	72,2	Ba2/BB-/BB-	
Kazakhstan	-1,3	-2,9	101	98	90,7	92	88	Baa3/BBB-/BBB	
Tajikistan	-0,4	-1	77,7	78,7	1,1	1	542	B3/B-/-	
Ukraine	-1,7	-1,1	92,3	91	20	19	485	Caa2/B-/B-	


Monetary policy	Key	/ rate	FX rat	te, aop	Inflation, YoY, eop		
	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	2018E	2019E	
Russia	7,5	7	64,5	67	3,7	4,3	
Armenia	6	6	482,2	484	3,5	3	
Azerbaijan	10	9	1,7	1,7	4,5	7	
Belarus	9,5	9	1,99	2,2	5,5	5,5	
Georgia	7	6,5	2,6	2,6	2,5	3,5	
Kazakhstan	9	8,5	345	355	6	5,5	
Tajikistan	14	10	9,2	9,5	4,5	5,5	
Ukraine	17,5	14	27,1	30	11,5	8	

Source: National statics agencies, IMF, ITI Capital

# Solvency ratio: Assessing Reserve Adequacy



Russia's reserve adequacy ratio (total reserves/foreign short-term liabilities) is 290% - the world's highest. The country's total reserves, including gold, have grown in the past four years by over \$100bln, thanks to MinFin FX purchases, increased gold and euro exposure, repayment of FX liabilities to CBR.






Source: IMF, CBR, ITI Capital

550

#### Macro risk assessment



Russia's macro risk assessment, based on level of inflation, current account, fiscal balance, public debt percentage of GDP, reserve adequacy ratio and higher rating in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking, is one of the lowest in the world.




Source: IMF, CBR, ITI Capital

## Russian ruble is ignoring fundamentals



Based on macro risk assessment and the current account balance, Russian ruble should have be trading 10% stronger vs US dollar – its underperformance was a reflection of additional risk premium.




Source: ITI Capital, IMF, CBR

### Russian FX performance could have been worse




Russian ruble was severely pressured by three major developments: the SDN sanctions, imposed on Rusal in April; the second round of US sanctions, announced in August; the high EM volatility.



#### Structure of Ruble volatility



The key factors behind the higher ruble volatility and additional risk premium




Global equities	30d correlation, %
USA vs EM	21
USA vs EU	-7
Europe vs EM	67
EM vs Russia	51
MSCI World vs MSCI Asia	65
FX market	
USDRUB vs EM FX	-54
USDRUB vs USDTRY	45
USDRUB vs USDBRL	37
USDRUB vs USDZAR	38
USDRUB vs EUR	-16
Oil	
USDRUB vs Brent oil	-20

#### USDRUB vs Oil correlation




Correlation between USD/RUB and oil prices is very low because of high volatility: the current 120-day correlation has sunk below 10% and tends to go still lower.



#### **EM Currencies vs Oil Prices**



Russian ruble's weak correlation with the oil prices is not unique – other EM currencies tend to ignore Brent as well.



#### Oil Price in Rubles Reaches Fair Levels



Despite ruble's weakness, Brent is now trading at fair levels in the Russian currency – thanks to the postponement of the new round of sanctions. That implies that the ruble's exchange rate is approaching a fair level. Improving market efficiency of ruble will support correlation.

Scenario analysis									
Brent oil, \$/bbl	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85
USD/RUB	77	73	70	68	67	66	64	62	61
EUR/RUB	87,8	83,2	79,8	77,5	76,4	75,24	73,0	70,7	69,5



### Ruble Weakness Spurs Government Bond Yield Higher




Long-term Russian government bond (OFZ) yield grew by 2 percentage points from the 1Q18 lows, reaching a peak in early September.



## Russian Government Bond (OFZ): Capital Outflow Slowdown




The foreign Capital outflow from the OFZ market has slowed down – since September the foreign investors' total portfolio has decreased by just a little over 50bln rubles. Their share in the market currently stands at just above 25%, with the aggregate holding down to the two-year low of 1.8trln rubles (\$27bln), the lowest since July 2016.



# OFZ Yield Curve: 90-100bp Slide In The Offing





#### **OFZ: Trade recommendations**




								Price upside, %	Price upside,	Yield upside, b.p	Yield upside, b.p
		Outstandi	i				Mod.durati	(Before August	% (Before	(Before August	(Before Rusal
Ticker	Name	ng, \$mIn	Coupon	maturity	PX_LAST	<b>YTM</b> , %	ons,yrs	selloff)	April selloff)	selloff)	selloff)
EJ8422747 corp	OFZ 23	250 000	7	16.08.2023	95,203	8,39	4,03	4,6%	7,8%	-116	-188
AN4153895 corp	OFZ 24	350 000	7,1	16.10.2024	94,398	8,51	4,87	5,0%	8,5%	-111	-165
AP6275485 corp	OFZ 21	323 198	7	15.12.2021	97,083	8,25	2,73	2,7%	5,0%	-103	-188
AR4276549 corp	OFZ 24	203 106	6,5	28.02.2024	92,152	8,51	4,45	4,6%	7,8%	-109	-164
LW5541799 corp	OFZ 26	350 000	7,75	16.09.2026	95,886	8,62	5,90	6,5%	10,5%	-109	-146
AM3604130 corp	OFZ 22	350 000	7,4	07.12.2022	97,421	8,3	3,45	3,6%	6,8%	-102	-189
AM8549157 corp	OFZ 33	350 000	7,7	23.03.2033	92,68	8,78	8,63	9,1%	12,7%	-107	-105
Average								5,2%	8,4%	-108,1	-163,6

#### OFZ-28 spread over US Treasuries




### OFZ total issuance, bln rubles






# Russian Policy Rate Expectations Driven by FX Market Volatility





#### Bank of Russia Policy Rate: Actual Levels and Expectations





### Local Rates Range-Bound, %






# Market Indicators of Russian Policy Rate




One of the most important policy rate indicators is the USD/RUB implied volatility.



# OFZ Yields Exceed Average Deposit Rate




One of the reasons why local banks are buying the Russian government bonds is that the return on this investment exceeds funding costs, because the bond yield to maturity is higher than the average deposit rate.



#### Carry Trade




Russia offers the best carry trade if its moderate inflation and stable economic growth are taken into account.



### Superior Carry Trade with Moderate Inflation






#### Finance Ministry's FX Purchases



Higher oil prices enabled Finance Ministry to step up FX purchases – the total volume could reach \$70bn this year, but only \$37bn were purchased on the open market.



Source: Ministry of Finance RF, ITI Capital, Bloomberg

### Finance Ministry's FX Purchases: Key Theme for 2019




- Finance Ministry's FX interventions coincided with a spike in FX volatility and drew much attention though their volumes were rather limited just \$250-300mln a day.
- We estimate the total volume to be just under \$70bn, including December purchases, which still have to be announced we think, in December the ministry is to buy around \$6.8bln, or \$310mln a day. So far the highest volumes were announced for November almost \$8bln (\$374mln a day).
- In August Russia's central bank had to suspend buying FX on the open market. By that moment it had purchased just \$2.8bln out of the previously announced \$5.8bln. Since then Finance Ministry's demand for foreign currency has been satisfied at the expense of the central bank's balances and it is supposed to be so till the end of the year. Thus, out of the total amount of Finance Ministry FX purchases just \$37bln was bought on the open market and \$33bln is to be bought off CBR's balances.
- Open market operations involve Finance Ministry transferring rubles, received from corporate taxpayers, to the central bank, which then uses the money to buy US dollars on Moscow Exchange at market rates.
- Non-market purchase of FX means that CBR still gets the rubles from the Finance Ministry, but doesn't spend them to buy dollars on the open market, i.e. the rubles do not end up on the balance of local banks selling FX to the central bank. So, the Russian lenders have to look for rubles elsewhere and this puts pressure on the available ruble liquidity. Bank of Russia records the FX purchase as an increase in FX liabilities to Finance Ministry, lowering ruble liabilities to local commercial banks, which use more liquidity from CBR deposits (the rubles deposited with the commercial banks).
- We expect the \$33bn, purchased this year from CBR without recourse to the open market, will be bought in the open market in the next couple of years with the whole amount distributed evenly. It would mean additional purchases of \$1bln per month in the open market. However, this scenario would be subject to the levels of FX volatility and the new US sanctions, which are expected to be imposed on Russia by the end of 1Q19.

### Current account and FX flows, \$bln




	Jan 18	Feb 18	Mar 18	Apr 18	May 18	June 18	July 18	Aug 18	Sept 18	Oct 18	Nov 18	Dec 18
Current account, \$ bln	13,3	7,8	9,7	7,0	6,0	6,5	8,0	9,0	9,1	12,1	8,0	8,5
Net debt payments, \$ bln.	-2,0	-5,4	-2,9	-4,1	-6,2	-3,3	-9,9	-4,0	-4,0	-3,8	-4,8	-6,4
Financials	-0,3	-2,6	-0,8	-0,8	-4,8	-0,9	-5,2	-2,0	-0,7	-1,9	-3,3	-0,7
Corporates	-1,6	-2,8	-2,1	-3,3	-1,4	-2,4	-4,7	-2,0	-3,3	-1,9	-1,5	-5,7
Minfin interventions	-4,5	-5,2	-3,4	-4,2	-5,3	-6,1	-5,6	-2,5				
OFZ outflows	0,7	1,1	0,3	-2,1	-1,6	-2,2	0,4	-1,5	-1,8	-1,0	-0,1	-0,2
Loans	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,0	1,0	-8,4			
Net FX balance	12,0	3,5	7,1	0,8	-1,8	0,9	-1,5	3,5	3,4	7,3	3,1	1,9
	1,4	-0,1	-0,8	-5,8	0,6	-0,3	0,2	-5,0	0,5	2,5	-0,5	1,0
Total debt, \$ bln	-15,0	-9,0	-5,2	-7,7	-8,1	-6,6	-15,4	-8,9	-10,3	-5,9	-6,7	-12,4
Financials	-0,4	-2,9	-0,9	-0,8	-5,4	-1,0	-5,8	-1,3	-0,8	-2,1	-3,7	-0,8
Corporates	-14,6	-6,1	-4,2	-6,8	-2,7	-5,6	-9,6	-7,6	-9,6	-3,8	-3,1	-11,7
Share of refinancing, %	86,8%	40,0%	43,0%	46,9%	23,5%	49,9%	35,7%	54,9%	61,6%	35,6%	28,2%	48,7%
Brent Oil, \$/bbl	66,87	69,05	65,78	70,27	75,17	79,44	74,25	77,42	82,72	80	70	70
USD/RUB	56,2	56,3	57,1	63,0	62,4	62,7	62,5	67,5	67,0	64,5	65,0	64,0



#### Estimates of short term FX liquidity




Major outflows from FX deposits in July and August pushed total commercial banks FX assets to seven-year low. In September, FX liquidity began to level off, which was reflected in contraction of USD/RUB 1-year swap basis.



### Non-resident holdings of Eurobonds




Non-resident holdings of Eurobonds have been rising, primarily due to shrinking supply as a result of redemptions and maturing, and is now close to 50%. Since April, when the US sanctions on Rusal were imposed, nominal non-resident investments in Russian Eurobonds have shrunk by just \$0.5bln (by 3%; over the last quarter they were reduced by less than 1%).



## Sovereign Eurobond Issuance: Actual and Expected




Total issuance of Russian sovereign Eurobonds was the lowest in two years and will remain low due to sanction risks and higher budget surplus.



### Russian and Latin American Sovereign Dollar Russian and Latin American Sovereign Dollar **Bonds Yield Curve**






# Spread between Brazil and Russia 10-year Dollar Bond Yields




Brazil's composite sovereign rating (BB-) is two notches below that of Russia (BBB-), whereas the average spread of the former's two-year bond over the latter's stands at 20-25bp. We expect the spread to widen by at least 50bp, subject to sanction developments.



### Eurobonds with biggest upside





#### Scenario analysis



We assume base-case scenario analysis, which involves positive developments over sanctions and easing geopolitical tensions. We expect to hear more guidance from US Congress before December 14th, after that date decisions can be made next year only. Our base-case scenario assumes a moderate year-end rally, which could lead to a recovery in Russia's oversold assets.

#### Scenario analysis (ITI Capital)


End of period 2018r	Probability, %	USD/RUB	Inflation, r/r	Oil, \$/bbl	Russia CBR key rate, %	Sberbank equity, rubles
Base (neutral)	60	64,5	3,80%	75	7,5	220+
Light weight	35	71,5	3,8-4,2%	75	(+50 b.p.) till 8	170
Heavy/Tough	5	80+	3,8-4,2%	75	(+150 b.p.) till 9	140

End of period 2018r	Probability, %	\$ Risk premium (long end of the curve), b.p	Risk premium (long end, OFZ), b.p	Non-resident share in OFZ, %	Eurobonds (VEB), price growth	Eurobonds (Non-financials)
Base (neutral)	60	(-30b.p.) till 180 b.p.	(-50 b.p.) till 8%	(+3%) till 28 %	4%	3-4%
Light weight	35	(+20 b.p.) till 235 b.p.	(+30 b.p.) till 9%	(-4%) till 21%	-3%	-1,50%
Heavy/Tough	5	(+140 b.p) till 350 b.p.	(+140 b.p.) till 10%	(-12%) till 13%	(-13%)-15%	(-4%)-5%

### Global equities with biggest upside




Russian equities is one of the most oversold with 12m consensus upside of 22% in USD.



#### ITI Funds Eurobonds







ITI Capital Ltd +44 (0) 20 3889 8333

Level 33 Tower 42 25 Old Broad Street London EC2N 1HQ, UK



Investment Company IT Invest JSC +7 (495) 933 32 32

Bld.1, 8 Presnenskaya emb., 8<sup>th</sup> Floor, MFC Capital City, Northern Block, 123112 Moscow, Russia



ITI Trade Ltd +44 (0) 1481 724956

11 New Street, St. Peter Port, Guernsey, GY1 2PF

ITI Capital Ltd. (hereinafter, the "Company") is not responsible for and does not give any warranties in connection with the transfer of marketing materials. This marketing document is for information purposes only. Any information in this document is based on data obtained from sources believed by the Companyto be reliable, but no representations, guarantees or warranties are made by the Company with regard to the accuracy, completeness or suitability of the data.

The information contained herein does not constitute the provision of investment advice. It is not intended to be nor should it be construed as an offer or solicitation to acquire, or dispose of, any of the financial instruments and/or securities mentioned in this document and will not form the basis or a part of any contract or offer.

Neither the Company, nor its affiliates, principals, directors, employees or agents accept any liability for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this marketing document and any accompanying materials. Investors should make their own investment decisions using their own independent advisors, as they believe necessary and based upon their specific financial situations and investment objectives when investing. This material is not intended for the use

of Private Customers as that term is defined under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in the United Kingdom. This material has been approved for publication in the United Kingdom and European Union by ITI Capital Limited, authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority and a member firm of the London Stock Exchange.

#### Licenses

- for brokerage, dealer and depositary activities (issued by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 17.03.2004)
- the provision of brokerage and other investment services on financial markets (issued by the Guernsey Financial Markets Commission on 24.03.2015)
- Permission to provide regulated products and services (issued by the Financial Conduct Authority on 27.09.2005)